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 This study investigated whether age differences in deceit detection are related to 
impairments in emotion recognition. Key cues to deceit are facial expressions of emotion 
(Frank & Ekman, 1997). The aging literature has shown an age-related decline in 
decoding emotions (e.g., Malatesta, Izard, Culver, & Nicolich, 1987). In the present 
study, 354 participants were presented with 20 interviews and asked to decide whether 
each man was lying or telling the truth. Ten interviews involved a crime and ten a social 
opinion. Each participant was in one of three presentation conditions: 1) visual only, 2) 
audio only, or 3) audio-visual. For crime interviews, age-related impairments in emotion 
recognition hindered older adults in the visual only condition. In the opinion topic 
interviews, older adults exhibited a truth bias which rendered them worse at detecting 
deceit than young adults. Cognitive and dispositional variables did not help to explain the 

















 Consider the following news story: 
 
Two men in their twenties visit an 87-year-old woman's home in Florida 
and tell her they are there to follow up on previous work done on her roof. 
After spending less than an hour on her roof and spray-painting it silver, 
they tell her she owes them $2,700 cash.  
 
Unfortunately, scams like these are extremely prevalent, especially for older adults. Older 
homeowners are popular targets for these home-repair schemes because they are likely to 
live in homes which need repair, and they are less likely to do the repairs themselves. In 
fact, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) reports that people over the 
age of 50 control 70 percent of the net worth of the nation's households (Morrison, 2003). 
More than half a million older adults are victims of financial fraud each year (Tueth, 
2000). The AARP also reports that seniors are targeted in 40 percent of all fraudulent 
financial scams (Morrison, 2003).  
 The victimization of older adults is a disturbing, yet very real, concern of today’s 
world. While the incidence of financial victimization does not increase with age, an 
important minority of elderly consumers are targeted by con artists who promise prizes, 
get-rich-quick schemes, and financial independence. These transgressions are particularly 
salient because we, as a society, realize the need to protect these vulnerable populations. 
The vulnerabilities associated with age may one day happen to each of us, so the reasons 
for the con artist’s success in crimes against this population are important to explore. One 
facet of these crimes is that con artists tell lies to convince their victims to part with their 
money. Laboratory studies of communication research consistently report that young 
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adults are scarcely better than chance at detecting deceit. It may be that older adults are 
even worse at detecting deceit, rendering the elderly even more susceptible to con artists 
than the general population. A review of the deceit detection literature, the aging and 
deception literature, and the emotion and aging literature culminate to critical predictions 


























2.1 Deceit Detection 
 
Deception is defined here as a deliberate attempt to mislead others. Con artists, 
salespeople, politicians, and poker players often rely on the assumption that people are 
generally not very good at catching lies. Research on the accuracy of deceit detection has 
largely supported this assumption. Four decades of deception research and over 100 
studies yield one major finding: overall accuracy at detecting deceit is just over 50 
percent, or chance (Miller & Stiff, 1993). In fact, numerous studies report that people are 
actually below chance at detecting lies. In a review of 40 studies on deceit detection, the 
overall accuracy for detecting truths was 67 percent while the overall accuracy for 
detecting lies was 44 percent (Vrij, 2000). Researchers have investigated a number of 
explanatory approaches for this low accuracy in detecting deceit. Among these 
explanatory approaches are people's private decision rules for detecting deceit, familiarity 
with the content of the message, state and trait suspiciousness of the decoder, and the role 
of emotion recognition. These four explanatory approaches will be discussed in the 
following four sections.  
2.1.1 Implicit Theories of Lie Detection 
 Several accurate nonverbal cues that indicate deception have been identified 
(DePaulo et al., 2003). In a meta-analysis of 120 independent samples, liars were shown 
to display fewer of the gestures used to illustrate speech, were more vocally tense, spoke 
in a higher pitched voice, and exhibited more pupil dilation than people telling the truth 
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(DePaulo et al., 2003). Perceivers seem, however, not to rely on these valid nonverbal 
cues. 
Paradoxically, people do employ implicit theories of deceit detection when 
judging the veracity of a message, but they rely on invalid physical cues to identify 
deception. In a study examining individuals’ perceptions of cues to deceit, most people, 
including those people who were professionally trained to recognize lying, held 
inaccurate beliefs about cues to deception (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996). In 
this study, laypersons and police officers rated behaviors on the extent to which they 
believed the behaviors would increase or decrease during lying. The authors compared 
participants’ ratings of behaviors frequently exhibited during deception to the actual 
frequencies of those behaviors during deception based on previous deception research. 
They found that people’s beliefs regarding deceptive behavior are very different from 
actual deceptive behavior. In particular, many people believe that nonverbal behaviors, 
such as arm and leg movements and self manipulations, increase during deception when 
in fact they decrease (Akehurst et al., 1996; Vrij, 1991).  
Participants also reported that they believe eye contact decreases when people are 
lying (Akehurst et al., 1996; Vrij, 1991). Careful analyses of deceptive behavior have 
shown that eye contact actually increases during deception. It is unclear why people rely 
on these invalid cues to deception as opposed to valid cues. One possible explanation lies 
in the fact that police manuals typically list gaze aversion and fidgeting as behaviors of 
liars, two invalid cues to deceit (Gordon & Fleisher, 2002). Perhaps the misinformation in 
these manuals has been circulated, leading to these common myths of liar behavior. The 
fact that people typically use invalid cues to detect deceit is surprising and disheartening. 
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It can also be viewed in a more positive light, however, because current research 
identifying valid cues to deception suggests the possibility for an intervention. If people 
unlearn the invalid cues and tune their antennas to recognize the valid cues to deception, 
they could improve their accuracy rate at detecting lies. 
2.1.2 Truth Bias Heuristic 
Other researchers explain our relatively poor ability to detect deceit as a result of 
our tendencies to limit in-depth processing of all available social information and instead 
utilize cognitive heuristics in everyday life. Cognitive heuristics are rules of thumb used 
to reduce the complexity of the environment for easier cognitive processing. The use of 
heuristics has both advantages and disadvantages. Heuristics are efficient, but they also 
render the individual susceptible to judgment biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
People have been shown to use a cognitive heuristic known as the truth bias when 
judging the veracity of a statement (Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999). The truth bias is 
the tendency to judge more statements as truths than as lies. Across four studies designed 
to investigate the truth bias phenomenon, the percentage of total items judged as truthful 
was significantly greater than the percentage of total items judged as lies (Levine et al., 
1999). In their third study, the familiarity of the topic in truth and lie messages was 
manipulated. Half of the topics discussed by targets on a videotape were current issues 
relevant to the campus from which participants were recruited, while the other half were 
issues from a different campus. Greater familiarity with a topic was hypothesized to 
reduce reliance on cognitive heuristics because elaborate and accurate information would 
be available to judge the truth of a statement. Conversely, unfamiliar topics were 
hypothesized to be more difficult to process, leading to a reliance on heuristic processing 
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and thus less accurate deceit detection. Collapsing across truths and lies, overall accuracy 
in the familiar condition was higher (69%) than accuracy in the unfamiliar condition 
(48%). For detection of lies, they found that accuracy was 53 percent in the familiar 
condition and 27 percent in the unfamiliar condition. These findings lend support to the 
idea that in the unfamiliar condition participants relied on a heuristic, or a well-
instantiated knowledge structure, such as the truth bias to inform their decisions of 
veracity. Conversely, in the familiar condition, participants were able to rely on their 
elaborated structural knowledge of the topic.  
The truth bias is assumed to serve as a heuristic that reduces the cognitive 
resources required to process complex information. For this reason, researchers expected 
to find an increase in the use of the truth bias heuristic in situations of cognitive load. 
Indeed, in a study which experimentally manipulated cognitive load in young adults, 
increased cognitive load impaired the young adults’ ability to detect lies (Millar & Millar, 
1997). These studies show that the same person may vary over time in their ability to 
detect deceit. Depending on the amount of cognitive capacity available to devote, and the 
motivation to devote this cognitive capacity, people may or may not rely on the truth bias 
heuristic. It is important to keep in mind that laboratory studies of deceit detection rarely 
use personally relevant situations. The generalizability of laboratory studies to everyday 
deceptions may be poor because judges in laboratory studies are not motivated to deeply 
process their decisions. 
2.1.3 Suspicion 
A number of other variables have been shown to influence veracity judgments. A 
third explanatory approach to deceit detection is to examine the relationship between 
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suspicion and judgments of deceit. We would expect people who are more suspicious to 
be more likely to suspect people of lying than people who are not. Indeed, suspicious 
people may exhibit a lie bias rather than a truth-bias. A lie bias is a tendency to judge 
more statements as lies than truths (Levine & McCornack, 1991). 
Dating couples were tested in a study designed to investigate the roles that 
situationally-aroused suspicion (or state-suspicion) and generalized communicative 
suspicion (or trait-suspicion) play in honesty judgments (Levine & McCornack, 1991). 
One member of each dyad was videotaped telling six lies and six truths, and the other 
member of the dyad had to judge the veracity of the videotaped statements. Three 
between-subjects conditions of state-suspicion were induced: low, moderate, and high. In 
the low state-suspicion condition, the “judge” was not told about the possibility that their 
partner would be lying. In the moderate state-suspicion condition, the judges were told 
that their partners may or may not be telling the truth. And finally, in the high state-
suspicion condition, judges were told that their partners were definitely lying on some of 
the statements. The Generalized Communicative Suspicion (GCS) scale, an individual 
difference measure created by the authors to assess trait suspiciousness, was administered 
to participants. Individuals who were moderate or high in trait suspiciousness were more 
likely to judge his or her partner’s statements as dishonest than individuals with low trait 
suspicion.  
Overall, the authors found that participants were more likely to judge their 
partners’ statements as false (a) when they were assigned to the moderate and high state-
suspicion conditions and (b) when they demonstrated higher levels of trait-suspicion.  
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Essentially, higher levels of induced- or individual-specific suspicion were associated 
with more skeptical honesty judgments.  
2.1.4 Emotion Recognition 
The consistent finding that we are not as good as we believe we are at catching 
lies seems contrary to our own intuitions about our social interactions with others. While 
some researchers have taken this robust finding and developed studies to investigate the 
mechanism for our errors, other researchers blame aspects of the typical methodology 
used in deception research for the surprisingly low accuracy rates. The stimuli used in 
much of the deception literature include either actors, or even participants, telling lies or 
telling truths. In most cases, the content and consequences of the messages are relatively 
mild. For example, actors might be asked to tell a lie or a truth about experiences from 
their past, such as getting lost in a shopping mall when they were a child. These 
statements are recorded and then participants are asked to judge each statement as a truth 
or a lie. Because the participants and actors in these stimuli are not invested in the results 
of their lies, the stimuli may lack those features of lying behavior that are critical to the 
construct validity of deceit detection paradigms. Namely, the stimuli are lacking 
emotions that are evoked when the stakes of being discovered as a liar are high.  
Frank and Ekman (1997, 2004) argue that these differences between real-world 
lies and lies in the laboratory have led to misleadingly low accuracy rates in deceit 
detection. The argument is that the liars and truth-tellers of previous deceit detection 
research have not been sufficiently motivated. More specifically, they found that the 
strength of emotions induced in the liars and truth-tellers determined whether participants 
would demonstrate near chance or better than chance deceit detection. Essentially, if the 
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stakes are high when a person lies, then that person will feel and display guilt, fear, and 
excitement. If the stakes are low, on the other hand, then liars will not adequately display 
feelings of guilt, fear, or excitement. These micro-expressions of emotion can reveal the 
liar to judges who use nonverbal cues to detect deceit.  
In a study which addressed this possibility, nurses were motivated to lie 
convincingly by telling them that their lying performance was related to success in their 
nursing careers (Ekman & Friesen, 1974). Overall, observers of these messages were 
significantly better at detecting deceit, and those who were most accurate reported basing 
their decisions on nonverbal behavior. Observers who were the least accurate, however, 
reported using only the verbal information to make their veracity judgments. 
Additional evidence for the validity of micro-expressions of emotion as valid cues 
to deceit comes from recent work by Frank and Ekman (1997, 2004). In these studies, 
liars and truth-tellers were motivated by the opportunity to earn an additional 50 dollars if 
they could convince the interviewer they were telling the truth. These scenes were 
videotaped and later showed to participants who had to judge whether each person was 
lying or telling the truth. When participants viewed liars and truth-tellers in this high 
stakes lies paradigm, they reached an average level of 60 percent accuracy in detecting 
deceit. Some participants were even at the 90 percent accuracy level. These results are in 
stark contrast to prior deception research, which found that people were rarely above 
chance at detecting deceit. Participants in this study also completed a micro-expression 
test in which they had to identify the emotion displayed in a series of photographs of 
facial expressions of emotion. Scores on the micro-expression test correlated significantly 
with accuracy in deceit detection. In order to validate the importance of the emotional 
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component in the high stakes lies videos, research assistants independently coded the 
videotapes using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978) and 
were able to correctly classify 80 percent of the targets based on the presence or absence 
of micro-expressions of fear or disgust. These results show that the emotions present in 
the high stakes lies stimuli do provide accurate cues to deception. 
In a further attempt to confirm that facial expressions of emotion are the key 
elements responsible for higher levels of deceit detection accuracy in the high stakes lies 
paradigm, the videos were broken down into three channels: a voice tone channel, a body 
channel, and a facial channel. Only the facial channel provided consistent accuracies of 
deceit detection across different situations (Frank & Ekman, 2004). 
These studies show that prior laboratory experiments on deceit detection may not 
be generalizable to what happens in everyday life. Indeed, when the stimuli is created 
using a high stakes lies paradigm, judges show higher levels of average accuracy at 
detecting deceit than shown with the typical laboratory deceit studies.  
2.2 Aging and Deceit Detection 
For the most part, the ability to detect deceit has not been investigated from a 
developmental perspective. Based on the deception literature and findings from the 
sociocognitive aging literature, there is reason to believe that older adults may show even 
greater deficits in deceit detection than young adults. More specifically, the 
sociocognitive literature has shown that older adults have unique vulnerabilities to social 
judgment biases (Blanchard-Fields & Horhota, 2005). This literature is suggestive of the 
possibility that the mechanisms which underlie social judgment biases may be operating 
similarly in deceit detection situations. 
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A recent aging and deception study found that older adults were better able to 
detect deceit than young adults (Bond, Thompson, & Malloy, 2005). The authors suggest 
that because older adults have greater accumulated experience with detecting truth and 
deception, their reliance on heuristics based on this experience puts them at an advantage 
in detecting deceit, compared to young adults. The messages were presented in audio 
format only, however. While nonverbal information such as tone of voice and speech 
errors may have been clues to deception in the audio tapes, facial expressions of emotion 
were not presented. According to Frank and Ekman (1997, 2004), facial expressions of 
emotion provide leakage cues to deception. Liars betray their emotions of fear, guilt, and 
excitement in micro-expressions of emotion.  
 Two studies have examined lie detection ability across the lifespan using visual 
stimuli. Because these studies relied on samples of law enforcement personnel, they used 
a limited age range which only extends into late middle age. One study found an age-
related decline in the ability to detect deceit (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991) in 10 videos of 
people lying or telling the truth about their feelings. Conversely, a positive correlation 
between age and detection ability for truthful reports was found when participants viewed 
videotapes of four different people lying or telling the truth about factual statements 
(Köhnken, 1987).  
 There are very few studies to date addressing the relationship between age and 
deceit detection. Those studies which have addressed this issue produced conflicting 
results. One possible explanation for these mixed results lies in the medium of 
presentation. Older adults may be just as good at detecting deceit with audio information 
only, but may be at a disadvantage when visual stimuli are provided. Another possible 
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reason for the conflicting results in the literature is that none of these studies used a high 
stakes lies paradigm, so they may be less typical of lies in daily life. 
 A number of important implications for age and deception come from the 
mainstream literature on deception reviewed in the previous section. The evidence that 
implicit theories of lie detection are often inaccurate points to the possibility of an 
intervention. If people learned to recognize the valid cues of deception, they might be less 
likely to fall prey to scams. All people would benefit from an intervention such as this, 
but it may be particularly important to focus on teaching the elderly these strategies 
because they are so often the victims of financial fraud. 
Research on the truth bias heuristic suggests that reduced cognitive capacity or 
motivation to use cognitive capacity, results in a tendency to judge more statements as 
truths than lies, leading to overall inaccurate deceit detection. Because older adults are 
shown to have fewer available cognitive resources than young adults (Salthouse, 1991), 
we might expect that older adults would rely on a cognitive heuristic such as the truth 
bias more frequently or to a greater extent, than young adults. This is one possible 
explanation for an age-related decrement in detecting deceit. 
The mainstream deception literature has also identified suspicion as an important 
individual difference factor in deceit detection. Anecdotally, the cause of older adults’ 
vulnerability to consumer fraud is often attributed to their more “trusting nature” in the 
media. Interestingly, older adults score lower than young adults on the GCS scale, 
indicating that they are less suspicious (Bond & Lee, 2005). In the present study, we will 




Recent work on deception has shown the importance of emotion recognition in 
detecting deceit using the high stakes lie paradigm (Frank & Ekman, 1997, 2004). 
Interestingly, age-related changes in these factors may lead to even worse abilities to 
deceit detection in the elderly, which would have important implications for the lives of 
older adults. A decrement in the detection of deceit may render older adults even more 
vulnerable to con artists and wily politicians. The next section contains a review of the 
extant literature on aging and emotion, focusing on those emotional processes which 
degrade over the lifespan. 
2.3 Aging and Emotion Recognition 
In general, emotion is a domain where older adults' functioning is preserved. The 
aging literature often makes the important distinction between an age-related decline in 
cognitive abilities and the preservation of emotion regulation and control (Lawton, 
Kleban, Rajagopal, & Dean, 1992; Gross et al., 1997). Laura Carstensen’s 
socioemotional selectivity theory accounts for these increases in emotion regulation as a 
shift from achievement-oriented goals to emotionally-relevant goals as time becomes 
constrained (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). While there is a great deal of 
evidence that the experience and regulation of emotions improves with age, the story is 
not as promising for the recognition of emotions across the lifespan.  
Socioemotional selectivity theory would predict that more attention would be paid 
to information relevant to emotional goals as we age. To test this hypothesis, pairs of 
faces were presented to younger and older participants (Mather & Carstensen, 2003). One 
of the faces in each pair was neutral while the other was either positive or negative. The 
speed with which young adults responded to the position of the dot-probe following the 
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presentation of faces was consistent regardless of the face which preceded its position. 
Older adults were faster to respond to the dot-probe when it appeared behind the face in 
the pair that displayed the greatest level of positive emotions. This attentional bias 
supports the theory that older adults avoid negative information.  
A number of other studies have shown a general age-related decline in the 
recognition of emotion. For example, compared to young and middle-aged adults, older 
decoders perform the most poorly in decoding facial expressions of emotion in 
videotapes (Malatesta, Izard, Culver, & Nicolich, 1987). In further support of this age-
related deficit in emotion recognition, age was negatively correlated with a composite 
score for emotion recognition using stimuli displaying blends of emotional expressions 
(Heckman & Blanchard-Fields, 2004). 
The aging and emotion literature has shown that older adults may possess a 
particular deficit for the recognition of certain emotions, not necessarily categorized by 
valence. In particular, there is some evidence that the recognition of anger, fear, and 
sadness show decline across the lifespan. The stimuli in these studies are photographs of 
young adults producing facial expressions of emotion. One study found that older adults 
are worse at recognizing sadness but better at identifying happiness, when compared to 
young adults (Moreno, Borod, Welkowitz, & Alpert, 1993). Other research has identified 
age-related impairments in recognizing anger and sadness, but not fear (Phillips, 
MacLean, & Allen, 2002).  
Further research indicates that the distinction between those aspects of emotion 
recognition that are spared and those which are lost may not be as simple as a strict 
matter of emotional valence (i.e., positive or negative). The preservation of the ability to 
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recognize positive emotions throughout the lifespan is consistent across studies. The 
negative emotional domain, however, shows preservation or improvement in the 
recognition of some emotions and decrements for others. For example, older adults were 
better at recognizing facial expressions of disgust than young adults in three experiments 
(Calder et al., 1993). This study also reported, however, a significant and progressive 
decrease in the recognition of fear and anger across the lifespan. Age-related decrements 
are found after controlling for individual differences in visual perception of faces, face 
processing, and fluid intelligence, indicating that it is face processing abilities tied to 
specific emotions which are affected by age, independent of many other age-related 
changes (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). The Sullivan and Ruffman study reported no 
decrements for the recognition of fear and happiness, which partially contradicts the age-
related decrement for fear recognition found by Calder and colleagues. These conflicting 
results are difficult to integrate and may have arisen due to differences in methodology. 
For instance, the face stimuli used in these studies vary immensely. Some photographs of 
facial expressions are presented in black and white while others are in color, some are 
posed while others are spontaneous, and some are flashed briefly on the screen while 
others are self-paced. All of the studies, however, point to differential losses and gains of 
emotion recognition for particular emotions. Research in this field is in its infancy, but a 
review of the studies which have addressed aging and deficits of specific emotions 
reveals that there does not appear to be a global emotion recognition deficit related to 
aging but rather age-related deficits for certain emotions (see Table 1 for results of 





Number of Studies to Find Age Differences in Facial Expressions of Emotion 
Findings Emotion 
 Fear Anger Disgust Happy Sad 
OA = YA 1 --- 1 2 --- 
OA < YA 3 5 --- 1 7 




These mixed results are difficult to interpret, but a differential decline of certain 
emotions, rather than a global decline, argues against a strict cognitive capacity 
explanation. The age-related decrement in the ability to detect emotions has been most 
strongly exhibited in the recognition of anger, not fear. Rather, it points to declines in 
specific subsystems tied to certain emotions. This possibility, however, needs to be 
empirically tested. 
Putting it all together, an age-related decrement in the ability to detect certain 
emotions may have implications for the ability to detect deceit. Older adults have been 
shown to be worse at recognizing anger and fear, when compared to young adults (Calder 
et al., 1993). The ability to recognize micro-expressions of emotion is an important 
component of deceit detection (Frank & Ekman, 1997, 2004). Older adults may be 
impaired at detecting deceit in face-to-face situations because they are unable to 












3.1 Current Study 
 
The goals of the current study were to 1) explore age-related differences in the 
detection of deceit; 2) explore the role of other individual difference variables in deceit 
detection across the lifespan (e.g., suspiciousness, interpersonal perception skills, and 
cognitive abilities); 3) explore age-related differences in deceit detection as a function of 
the presence of facial cues of emotion; and 4) examine the role of emotion recognition 
differences in explaining age-related differences in deceit detection. 
This is the first study in a program of research investigating the vulnerability of 
older adults to deception. In this study, we focused on the ability to detect deceit that is 
relevant for face-to-face situations using a high stakes lies paradigm. Older adults may be 
vulnerable to particular types of deceit for various reasons. For example, in face-to-face 
situations older adults may be vulnerable due to a deficit in emotion recognition. When 
only audio cues are present, however, older adults may be vulnerable due to cognitive 
capacity deficits.   
This study used an extreme-groups design with young and older adults only. 
Because there are so few studies on aging and deceit detection in the literature, an age-
related difference must first be established before investigating the pattern across the 
lifespan. There were three conditions of stimuli presentation: (1) visual only, (2) audio 
only, and (3) audio-visual. These conditions were designed to help determine whether 
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visual information is a critical dimension in accounting for differences in deceit 
detection.  
This study has two main hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Young adults will outperform older adults in the two conditions 
with visual stimuli (the visual only and audio-visual conditions). We expected older 
adults to have a deficit in recognizing facial expressions of emotion rendering them at a 
greater disadvantage in detecting deceit when facial cues are present. When only audio 
cues are present, we did not expect older adults to be at a disadvantage compared to 
young adults and thus no age differences were expected in the audio only condition. 
Despite the fact that Bond and colleagues (2005) found an age-related increase in the 
ability to detect deceit using audio only, we do not expect to replicate these findings. The 
stimuli in the present study are markedly different from those used by Bond and 
colleagues in that we employed the high stakes lies paradigm. When emotional cues are 
present, even in the voice channel, accumulated experience may not make a difference in 
the detection of deceit. For this reason, we expected age differences only in those 
conditions which provide facial cues.  
We also had several exploratory hypotheses regarding alternative predictors of 
deceit detection accuracy. We expected high suspiciousness to lead to a lie-bias. More 
specifically, individuals who score high in suspiciousness on the Generalized 
Communicative Suspicion scale should show a tendency to judge more statements as lies 
than truths. This tendency was expected to decrease deceit detection accuracy. Older 
adults score lower on suspiciousness than young adults (Bond & Lee, 2005), which may 
lead to age differences in this construct. We also expected individual differences in the 
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Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (Costanzo & Archer, 1993) to predict deceit detection 
accuracy. Individuals who are better at perceiving interpersonal relationships in social 
situations should also be better at person-perception judgments. We did not have specific 
hypotheses about the age effects of these exploratory variables.  
Hypothesis 2: We expected that the relationship between age and deceit detection 
would be mediated by emotion recognition ability. Past research has shown that older 
adults are impaired in the ability to detect certain emotions (anger, sadness, and fear). In 
the high stakes lies paradigm, these expressions of emotion have been shown to be valid 
cues to deceit. For these reasons, we expected individual differences in the ability to 
recognize emotions in facial expressions to account for age differences in the ability to 
detect deceit.  
3.2 Participants 
3.2.1 Recruitment 
 Young adult participants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate psychology 
students and from the community. Each student received credit hours toward a course 
participation requirement and non-students received monetary remuneration ($30). Older 
adult participants were recruited from our older adult participant pool. Each older adult 
participant received monetary remuneration for participation ($30). 
3.2.2 Exclusions 
 A total of 394 participants (184 young adults and 209 older adults) completed this 
study. Of these participants, 10 percent (n = 40) were excluded from data analyses. 
Participants were excluded for a variety of reasons. These reasons include participants 
who fell below cut-off criteria for the cognitive and perceptual ability measures, 
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participants with missing data, participants who represented outliers, participants who 
were recruited differently, and participants who were not attentive during the experiment 
(see Table 2 for a breakdown of the participant exclusions).  
 More specifically, the exclusions are as follows: two older adult participants were 
excluded because they did not reach a minimum cut-off criterion of five correct on the 
Advanced Vocabulary Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Derman, 1976). One young 
adult who scored zero correct on the working memory test was excluded because no other 
young adult scored this low. Two older adults whose visual acuity was worse than our 
cut-off criterion of 20/60 were excluded. Seven older adult participants were excluded 
because they were missing data on the deceit detection questionnaire. Two young adults 
and six older adults were missing data on the emotion recognition test due to either 
technical failures with the computer program or an inability to finish the test. Outliers in 
the emotion recognition test were determined as any score more than two standard 
deviations away from the mean of the sum of the number of negative emotions answered 
correctly, separately for young and older adults. This exclusion criteria resulted in six 
young adults and six older adults being excluded because they scored more than two 
standard deviations lower than the mean for young adults (M = 65.68, SD = 7.29) and 
older adults (M = 54.85, SD = 12.21), respectively. Six young adults, who were recruited 
through the community, rather than the university participant pool, were excluded 
because they consistently scored significantly lower than our university participant pool 
young adults on the cognitive tasks. Two young adult participants were excluded because 
they were laughing and roughhousing during the experiment. Thus, a total of 17 young 
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adults and 23 older adults were excluded from the study. This leaves a total of 354 




Participant Exclusions       
Reason for Exclusion 
Number of Participants 
Excluded 
 # YA # OA Total 
Scored < 5 Correct on Vocabulary Test 0 2 2 
Outlier for Age Group on Audio Computation-Span 1 0 1 
Scored > 20/60 Visual Acuity 0 2 2 
Missing Data on Deceit Detection Questionnaire 0 7 7 
Missing Data on Emotion Recognition Test 2 6 8 
Outlier for Age Group on Emotion Recognition Test 6 6 12 
Different Recruitment Procedure 6 0 6 
Not Attentive during Experiment 2 0 2 
Total 17 23 40 
 
 
3.2.3 Sample Characteristics 
 Of the 354 participants remaining after exclusions approximately 50 percent are 
women (Female n = 179; Male n = 175). There were approximately 55 young adults and 
55 older adults in each condition (see Table 3 for a breakdown of the number of 
participants in each cell). Half of the participants were presented the crime topic 
interviews first and the opinion topic interviews (n = 177) and the other half were 









 Number of Participants in Each Condition by Age Group 
  Age Group   
  Young Adults Older Adults Total 
 Visual Only 55 60 115 
Condition Audio Only 56 55 111 
  Audio-Visual 56 72 128 




 On average, participants had more than 12 years of formal education (M = 14.30 
years, SD = 2.02) with older adults reporting significantly more years of education (M = 
14.74, SE = .14) than young adults (M = 13.80, SE = .15; F(1, 352) = 20.15, p < .01). The 
majority of participants were Caucasian (74%) or Black (12%). See Table 4 for a 




Race Characteristics of Sample     
Race Frequency Percent 
Caucasian 261 74% 
Black or African American 42 12% 
Asian 27 8% 
More than one race 11 3% 
Other 6 2% 
American Indian/Alaska Native 1 0% 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander 1 0% 
Missing 5 1% 







 The participants in this sample exhibit the typical pattern of age differences in 
perceptual and cognitive abilities (Table 5). Specifically, young adults exhibited better 
visual acuity (M = 17.98, SE = .57) and facial discrimination skills (M = 23.35, SE = .17) 
when compared to older adults (M = 26.28, SE = .54; M = 21.57, SE = .16, respectively; 
ps < .01). The score for visual acuity was the bottom number of the Snellen fraction such 
that 20/20 would be good vision and higher denominators (e.g., 20/60) indicate worse 
visual acuity. Young adults also outperformed older adults on our measures of fluid 
intelligence (MYA = 24.41, SEYA = .34; MOA = 14.96, SEOA = .32, respectively) and 
working memory (MYA = 5.09, SEYA = .10; MOA = 2.02, SEOA = .09, respectively; ps < 
.01). Older adults, however, were significantly better than young adults on our measure 
of crystallized intelligence, the Advanced Vocabulary Test (MOA = 21.61, SEOA = .42; 















One-Way ANOVAs: Age-Related Differences in Perceptual and Cognitive Abilities 
 YA  OA       
 Mean SE Mean SE F p η2
Visual Acuity        
Snellen 17.98 .57 26.28 .54 113.15 .00 .24
(Higher scores = worse visual acuity)               
Facial Discrimination        
Benton 23.35 .17 21.57 .16 55.97 .00 .14
(Maximum = 27)               
Fluid Intelligence        
Letter Sets 24.41 .34 14.96 .32 410.56 .00 .54
(Maximum = 30)               
Working Memory        
Audio-Computation Test 5.09 .10 2.02 .09 511.52 .00 .59
(Maximum = 7)               
Crystallized Intelligence        
Vocabulary Test 19.04 .45 21.61 .42 17.63 .00 .05




3.3.1 Demographics Form 
 Participants filled out a demographics form as required by the National Institute 
on Aging. This form included information about age, gender, ethnic background, and 
health. For health, participants were asked to rate their overall health on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = poor, 5 = excellent). 
3.3.2 Perceptual Functioning 
 Participants were screened for vision using two tests. The first was a measure of 
visual acuity, using the Snellen chart (Snellen, 1862). This is the standard eye chart used 
by optometrists. Participant’s score was the denominator in the fraction that represented 
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the smallest line on the chart the participant could read with fewer than three mistakes 
(e.g., 20/40 would receive a score of 40).  
We used a second test to determine whether participants could correctly 
discriminate between human faces because we thought this perceptual ability would be 
more closely related to the ability to decode facial expressions. Thus, for the second test 
of perceptual functioning, we administered the Benton Facial Discrimination Test Short 
Form (Levin, Hamsher, & Benton, 1975) which assesses the capacity to identify and 
discriminate photographs of unfamiliar human faces. On a sample-to-test reliability, the 
internal consistency of the new short form was Cronbach's α = .69. This test is predictive 
of prosopagnosia, a specific deficit in facial recognition. In this task, participants were 
first presented with a target face on the first page. On the facing page, they had to identify 
the identical target face in an array of six faces. Photographs of male and female faces 
were used and were cropped closely so that only the face was visible. On subsequent 
trials, three of the six pictures matched the target face and the participant was asked to 
identify all three. There were 27 targets to match in total and participants' scores were the 
number of target faces identified correctly.  
3.3.3 Cognitive Abilities 
3.3.3.1 Vocabulary Test 
The Advanced Vocabulary Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976) was used to measure verbal 
ability. For each of the 36 items, participants circled the word from a list of four words 
that is closest in meaning to a target vocabulary word. The difficulty of the vocabulary 




3.3.3.2 Letter Sets Test 
 Fluid intelligence was measured using the Educational Testing Service Letter Sets 
Test – I-1 (Rev.) (Ekstrom et al., 1976). For each of the 30 items, participants were 
presented with five letter sets (e.g., ABCD, RSTU, OPMN, FGHI, WXYZ) and had to 
deduce the rule which four of the letter sets follow. They responded by circling the set of 
letters which do not follow the rule. In the example above, the rule is that four of the 
letter sets are in alphabetical order; the response would be to mark an "X" over OPMN, 
which violates this rule. The score is the number of correct responses. 
3.3.3.3 Audio-Computation Span 
Working memory capacity was assessed using the audio computation span task 
(Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Participants heard a series of arithmetic problems that they 
were required to solve while at the same time remembering the second digit from each 
problem. The number of arithmetic problems presented in each set increased from one to 
seven with three trials at each set level. After completing the arithmetic for each trial, the 
participants were asked to recall the second digit from each problem presented. The task 
is scored based on the participant’s ability to accurately perform the arithmetic problems 
and recall the second digit from each problem. Working memory span is designated as 
the highest number of digits recalled correctly on at least two of the three trials with that 
set length. 
3.3.4 Deceit Detection 
3.3.4.1 Deceit Detection Stimuli 
 The stimulus material for the deceit detection task was obtained from Frank and 
Ekman (1997, 2004). The material consists of two videos. Each video contains interviews 
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with 10 different men, ages 18-28 years, from the San Francisco area. One video consists 
of a crime interrogation and the other is a social opinion interrogation. In both situations, 
a man is being interrogated by an interviewer. The interrogation is either on whether they 
stole money from a briefcase a few minutes prior to the interrogation or what their true 
opinion is on capital punishment or banning smoking. The men in each scene are 
different, but the interviewer is the same person in all scenes. 
 The six questions the interviewer asked during the crime interrogation are as 
follows: 1) Describe exactly what happened, what you saw and did, when you were in 
that room; 2) Describe for me what your thoughts were when you entered that room; 3) 
Do you know how much money was--or was supposed to be--in the envelope; 4) Did you 
take the money from the envelope; 5) Did you bring the money with you into this room; 
and 6) Are you lying to me now? 
 The six questions the interviewer asked each interviewee in the social opinion 
interrogation were as follows: 1) What is your position on this current event issue; 2) 
Why is it that you believe what you do on this issue; 3) How long have you had this 
opinion; 4) Is this your true opinion; 5) You didn't just make up this opinion a few 
minutes ago; and 6) Are you lying to me now? 
 Each interview is approximately one minute in length and shows the interviewed 
man in facial close-up with full audio. The interrogator can be heard, but not seen, asking 
questions. The duration of the crime topic video is approximately 12 minutes. The 





3.3.4.2 Deceit Detection Questionnaire 
 To introduce the deceit detection task, participants were told that, Anywhere from 
1/4 to 3/4 of the people in these interviews are lying. Prior to the presentation of the 
deceit detection interviews, participants rated how good they believe they are at knowing 
when someone else is lying on a 5-point Likert Scale (1 = very poor, 5 = very good). 
Both young and older adults reported being about average at knowing when someone is 
lying (MYA = 3.29, SEYA = .05; MOA = 3.26, SEOA = .05, respectively). There were no age 
differences in this judgment, F < 1.0. After each interrogation scene, there was a pause 
for participants to circle their judgment on the target person's truthfulness. For each 
scene, participants circled either the word truthful or lying. They also rated their 
confidence for each judgment (1 = not at all certain, 7 = extremely certain). There were 
no age differences in the average confident judgment for the crime topic interviews (MYA 
= 4.20, SEYA = .07; MOA = 4.15, SEOA = .07, respectively) or the opinion topic interviews 
(MYA = 4.36, SEYA = .07; MOA = 4.30, SEOA = .07, respectively), Fs < 1.0. Both young 
and older adults were significantly more confident, on average, for the opinion topic 
interviews than the crime topic interviews, young adults t(161) = -3.25, p < .01 and older 
adults t(170) = -2.83, p < .01. 
 The presentation of the crime topic interviews and the social opinion topic 
interviews was counterbalanced between participants. The videos were projected onto a 
large screen and all participants were equidistant from the screen. After each set of 10 
scenes (crime or social opinion), participants rated on a 5-point Likert Scale how well 




3.3.4.3 Deceit Detection Thought Listing 
 After the first 10 interviews, participants were asked to write down the factors that 
went into their judgment about the last interview presented (i.e., Number 10). After the 
second set of 10 interviews, participants were again asked to write down the factors that 
went into their judgment about only the last interview presented (i.e., Number 10 from 
second set).  
 After the deceit detection task was completed (i.e., all 20 interviews were 
presented), participants were asked to indicate the factors that went into their judgments 
of deception and truth-telling in an open format. Because we thought these factors might 
not be spontaneously provided, participants were also given a second page after 
completing this initial open thought listing task. On this second page, participants were 
probed with more specific questions regarding the factors they used when making their 
judgments, specifically related to the verbal, nonverbal, facial, and body cues they used 
in making their judgments.  
3.3.4.3.1 Qualitative Coding of Thought Listing  
 A theory and data-driven qualitative coding scheme was developed for the 
thought listing responses. The coding scheme includes the following 23 categories: eye 
contact, eye movement, swallowing, touching face, gestures/hand movement, head 
movement, body movement, body language, appearance, laughter, nervousness, direction 
of gaze, speed of speech, facial expressions, smiling, manner, pauses, quantity of 
response, quality of argument, tone of voice, content, question or topic, and not codeable. 
For a complete description and examples of each category in this coding scheme refer to 




Qualitative Coding Scheme 
Category Description Example 
Eye Contact Any reference to the amount of, or 
presence of, eye contact. 
He maintained very direct eye 
contact with the detective. 
Eye Movement Any reference to the type or 
amount of eye movement (e.g., 
shifty or a lot of eye movements 
including eyebrows). 
If eyes were shifty, especially 
looking left while answering 
question, then the person was 
lying.   
Swallowing Any reference to swallowing. There was no nervous 
swallowing as in some of the 
other interviews. 
Touching Face References to the amount or type 
of face touching. 
If someone made contact with 
their face then he was lying. 
Gestures/Hand 
Movement 
Any reference to the amount or 
type of hand movement, general or 
specific. 
He appeared to be pointing at 
something. 
Head Movement Any reference to head movement 
including amount or type of head 
movement (e.g., nodding). 
Shaking their head a lot. 
Body Movement References to the amount or 
presence of body movement.  
Did not make continuous body 
movements like some of the 
other people.  
Body Language References to the body that are not 
encompassed in Body Movement 
(e.g., posture, position) and any 
citations of the exact phrase “body 
language.” 
Body language such as shifting 
weight I saw as lying. 
Appearance Any reference to physical 
characteristics including (but not 
limited to) race, hair color, type of 
dress (including hats or glasses), 
and personal hygiene. 
People with glasses were 
harder to read. 
Laughter Any reference to laughter. He also even seemed to laugh 
at one point. 
  Nervousness  Any description of the suspect as 
behaving in a  nervous, suspicious, 
or self-conscious manner (or the 
absence of). 
1. Did not look confident.            



















Any mention of where the person 
is looking. 
Was not always looking 
straight forward. 
Speed of Speech Reference to speed of speaking 
(e.g., slow or fast). 
He seemed to speak quickly. 
Facial 
Expressions 
Any mention of facial expressions 
of emotion. 
Very little face expressions. 
Smiling Presence or absence of a smile. 
 
Him smiling looked like he was 
nervous by the interviewer's 
questioning. 
Manner Reference to anything about the 
suspect's manner, demeanor, (e.g., 
friendly or unfriendly, or active)  
He was a little too cocky. 
Pauses Reference to the length or 
frequency of pauses during the 
conversation (or lack of). 




Reference to the amount of speech 





Reference to the degree of 
elaboration, whether the arguments 
are convincing (or not), the clarity 
of the argument and/or the 
specificity of the arguments. 
1. The arguments were clearly 
presented. 
2. The suspect gave good, 
convincing arguments. 
Tone of Voice Any reference to the tone, 
inflection, or how the suspect's 
voice sounded. 
Inflection of voice. 
Content Any reference to the actual content 
of the suspect's responses. 
When the money wasn’t there 
the subject said this to cover 
up that he had taken it. 
Question or 
Topic 
Any reference to the topic or 
questions the interviewer asks. 
Seriousness of issue. 
Not Codeable Any off-topic response that does 
not fit within any other category. 
When I was growing up, we 
taught our children the 







 Two coders independently coded 22 percent of the 2,262 responses as presence or 
absence for each category. Coders discussed discrepancies to reach an agreement. 
Interrater reliability was 78 percent agreement. The remainder of the responses were 
coded by a single coder. The frequencies of each category mentioned by age groups are 
represented as percentages (Table 7). The most frequently mentioned cues to deception 
reported by participants were nervousness (young = 73%, old = 50%) and manner (young 




Frequency of Coding Categories Mentioned by Age Group 
Category Young Adults Older Adults Across Age 
Nervousness 73% 50% 61%
Manner 52% 52% 52%
Pauses 56% 41% 48%
Quality of Argument 55% 38% 46%
Content 47% 45% 46%
Eye Contact 36% 36% 36%
Eye Movement 41% 31% 36%
Facial Expressions 29% 30% 30%
Tone of Voice 37% 24% 30%
Laughter 41% 16% 28%
Not Codeable 26% 27% 27%
Body Movement 26% 24% 25%
Direction of Gaze 29% 22% 25%
Smiling 23% 17% 20%
Gestures/Hand Movement 26% 13% 19%
Body Language 20% 18% 19%
Quantity of Response 20% 11% 15%
Head Movement 12% 16% 14%
Touching Face 15% 10% 12%
Appearance 13% 12% 12%
Speed of Speech 17% 8% 12%
Question or Topic 5% 10% 8%




3.3.5 Interpersonal Perception Task 
 In order to determine whether individual differences in the ability to decode 
nonverbal information in general is related to the ability to detect deceit, a measure of 
interpersonal perception skills was used. The Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (IPT-15) 
(Costanzo & Archer, 1993) was designed to assess nonverbal communication and social 
perception skills. The videotape consists of 15 scenes, each 30-60 seconds in duration. 
Each scene can be categorized into one of five domains: intimacy, competition, 
deception, kinship, or status and there is always an objectively correct answer. For 
example, participants viewed a scene with two adults and one child interacting. 
Participants had to decide which adult is the child's parent. This would be an example of 
a kinship type of social judgment. And there is an objectively correct answer because one 
of the adults acting in the scene is the child's parent in real life.  
3.3.6 Generalized Communicative Suspicion Scale 
 In order to determine whether dispositional differences in suspicion are related to 
the ability to detect deceit, we measured individual differences in suspiciousness. The 
Generalized Communicative Suspicion scale (Levine & McCornack, 1991) measures a 
predisposition toward viewing the communication behaviors of others as deceptive. 
Participants rate their degree of agreement with 14 items on a 7-point Likert Scale (1 = 
strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree). This measure of suspiciousness includes items 
such as, When I first meet someone, I assume that they are probably lying to me about 
some things. On a reliability sample, the test had high internal consistency (Cronbach's 




3.3.7 Emotion Recognition 
 In order to test whether emotion recognition abilities are related to the ability to 
detect deceit, participants were given a test on identifying emotions. The faces for the test 
of emotion recognition were obtained from the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of 
Emotion (MSFDE; Beaupré, Cheung, & Hess, 2000). The MSFDE consists of facial 
expressions of emotion by men and women of European and African descent. Each 
expression was created using a directed facial action task and all expressions were FACS 
coded to assure identical expressions across actors. The set contains expressions of anger, 
joy, shame, fear, and disgust. All expressions had been morphed into three different 
levels of intensity. For the current study, the photographs were displayed on a computer 
screen. The E-prime program was used to create the test. The order of faces was 
randomly presented to participants, each for 1500 milliseconds (1.5 seconds). Each 
emotion was presented a total of 24 times during the task (eight times at each of the three 
intensities). Participants then responded by identifying which emotion was displayed 
(number keys represented the five different emotions; 1 = anger, 2 = joy, 3 = shame, 4 = 
fear, and 5 = disgust). 
3.4 Procedure 
 Participants were tested in groups of one to four. Only participants in the same 
age group were allowed in the same session (i.e., young adults were tested with other 
young adults and older adults were tested with other older adults). Participants first read 
through and filled out a consent form. Next, the experimenter conducted the visual acuity 
test for each participant individually (the Snellen vision chart). Participants then took the 
Benton Facial Discrimination Test. Next, the deceit detection interviews were presented, 
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during which participants filled out the Deceit Detection Questionnaire and responded to 
the Thought Listing task. Participants then completed the Audio-Computation Span task.  
At this point, participants were approximately half-way through the study and were given 
a five minute break. When participants returned from the break, they were administered 
two more cognitive abilities measures: the Vocabulary and Letter Sets tests. Next, 
participants watched and answered questions on the Interpersonal Perception Task-15. 
After the IPT-15, participants sat at an individual work station to complete the Emotion 
Recognition task on the computer. Next, participants responded to the Generalized 
Communicative Suspicion scale, and completed the Demographics Form. Participants 
were debriefed and compensated for their time at the end of the study. The study session 




























 First, we tested for age differences in the ability to detect deceit. Second, we 
tested the influence of our exploratory variables on deceit detection accuracy. Third, we 
examined the role of emotion recognition in the ability to detect deceit and tested the 
mediated model.  
4.1 Deceit Detection Accuracy 
4.1.1 Effect of Age 
 Recall that previous aging and deception research found that older women were 
the best at detecting deceit (Bond et al., 2005). Based on these previous results, we 
investigated whether there was an interaction of age with gender or a main effect of 
gender for deceit detection with our stimuli. The gender effects were tested by 
performing a two-way between-subjects univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). Age, 
Gender, and the Age X Gender interaction term were included as between-subjects 
independent variables. This analysis was performed three times with different dependent 
variables: 1) deceit detection accuracy collapsed across topic, 2) deceit detection 
accuracy scores for the crime topic interviews, and 3) deceit detection accuracy scores for 
the opinion topic interviews.  
 The Age X Gender interaction did not reach significance for the total deceit 
detection accuracy score, nor for deceit detection accuracy scores separately by topic (ps 
> .10). Men and women perform equally well at detecting deceit across the two topics 
(crime and opinion) and separately for the two topics (ps >.10). Because there were no 
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gender effects, gender is excluded from further analyses examining deceit detection 
accuracy scores. 
 Next, in order to test the full model, we conducted a 2(Age: young vs. old) X 
3(Condition: visual, audio, audio-visual) X 2(Topic: crime vs. opinion) mixed-design 
ANOVA with age and condition as between-subjects variables and topic as a within-
subject variable. There was a main effect of age with young adults (M = 5.85, SE = .09) 
performing better than older adults (M = 5.50, SE = .08) at detecting deceit (F(1, 348) = 
9.42, p < .01, d = .23). (See Figure 1 for a graph of the age differences in deceit detection 























Age-Related Differences in Deceit Detection Accuracy by Topic 
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There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 348) = 5.56, p < .01, η2 = .03. 
There was no main effect of topic, p > .10, indicating that deceit detection accuracy does 
not differ depending on the topic.  
These main effects, however, were qualified by a Topic X Condition interaction, 
F(2, 348) = 13.17, p < .01, η2 = .07. Pairwise comparisons revealed that for the crime 
topic, all three conditions significantly differed from each other, with the audio-visual 
condition (M = 6.30, SE = .14) outperforming the audio condition (M = 5.70, SE = .15), 
which in turn was better than the visual condition (M = 5.15, SE = .14), ps < .05. For the 
opinion topic, none of the conditions differed from each other. None of the Age X Topic, 
the Age X Condition, nor the Age X Condition X Topic interactions reached significance, 
Fs < 1.0. The main finding of these results is that young adults are better at detecting 
deceit than older adults when deceit detection accuracy is collapsed across condition.  
4.1.2 Effect of Condition: Medium of Presentation 
 Because we found a main effect of condition, we ran follow-up t-tests to 
determine which experimental conditions had an effect. This analysis was conducted 
three times with different dependent variables: 1) deceit detection accuracy scores 
collapsed across topic, 2) deceit detection accuracy scores for the crime topic only, and 3) 
deceit detection accuracy scores for the opinion topic only. 
For deceit detection accuracy collapsed across topic, each condition's mean was 
compared to each other condition's mean using independent sample t-tests in order to 
determine which conditions differed from each other. The only significant difference 
found in these comparisons was between the deceit detection accuracy scores in the 
audio-visual condition and the visual only condition, t(241) = -3.16, p < .01, d = .41. 
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Specifically, participants in the audio-visual condition (M = 11.77, SE = .18) were better 
at detecting deceit than participants in the visual only condition (M = 10.89, SE = .21), 
when deceit detection accuracy scores are summed across topic. 
 The Condition X Age interaction term for the crime topic interviews did not reach 
significance, p > .10. There was, however, a main effect of condition for deceit detection 
in the crime topic interviews (F(2, 348) = 17.15, p < .01) with participants in the audio 
only condition (M = 5.70, SE = .14) and the audio-visual condition (M = 6.27, SE = .13) 
outperforming participants in the visual only condition (M = 5.13, SE = .15), ps < .01, d = 
.37 and .73, respectively. Also, participants in the audio-visual condition were better at 
detecting deceit than participants in the audio only condition, t(237) = -2.90, p < .01,       
d = .38. For the opinion topic interviews there was no interaction of condition with age,    
p > .10. There was also no effect of condition for deceit detection accuracy in the opinion 
topic interviews, p > .10. 
4.1.3 Age-Related Differences by Condition 
 Although the Age X Condition interaction was not significant, we wanted to 
examine the age differences by condition because we hypothesized that the visual only 
condition would show greater age differences than the other two conditions. Thus, the 
simple effect of age was computed at each level of the three conditions separately by 
topic. For the crime topic deceit detection accuracy (Figure 2), only the visual only 
condition shows significant age-related differences (F(1, 348) = 6.52, p < .05) with young 
adults (M = 5.51, SE = .21) outperforming older adults (M = 4.78, SE = .20). For the 
opinion topic deceit detection accuracy (Figure 3), there were no significant age-related 

















































Age Differences in Opinion Deceit Detection Accuracy by Condition 
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4.1.4 Within-Age Condition Effects 
 
 For each of the two age groups, the mean of each condition was compared to the 
mean of each of the other conditions using independent sample t-tests.  
4.1.4.1 Young Adults 
For deceit detection accuracy collapsed across topic, the only significant 
condition differences for young adults was found when the audio-visual condition (M = 
12.25, SE = .24) was compared to the visual only condition (M = 11.27, SE = .29). 
Specifically, young adults were better at detecting deceit in the audio-visual condition 
than the visual only condition, t(109) = -2.60, p < .05. For the crime deceit detection 
accuracy, young adults were significantly more accurate in the audio-visual condition (M 
= 6.54, SE = .19) than either the visual only (M = 5.51, SE = .20) or audio only (M = 
5.70, SE = .20) conditions, ps < .01. For opinion deceit detection accuracy, there were no 
significant within-age condition effects for young adults. 
4.1.4.2 Older Adults 
Like young adults, older adults only showed a significant condition difference for 
deceit detection accuracy collapsed across topic when the audio-visual condition (M = 
11.39, SE = .25) was compared to the visual only condition (M = 10.53, SE = .31). That 
is, older adults were significantly better at detecting deceit in the audio-visual condition 
when compared to the visual only condition, t(130) = -2.17, p < .05. 
 For the crime topic interviews, older adults were better in the two conditions with 
an audio component, the audio only condition (M = 5.71, SE = .20) and the audio-visual 
condition (M = 6.06, SE = .18), when compared to the visual only condition (M = 4.78, 
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SE = .22), ps < .01. For the opinion deceit detection accuracy, there were no significant 
within-age condition effects.  
4.1.5 Chance 
Deception researchers often note that most people are not much better than chance 
at detecting deceit (see Anderson et al., 1997 for a review). In order to test whether deceit 
detection accuracy is different from chance in our study, one-sample t-tests were 
conducted comparing the deceit detection accuracy scores against the chance level scores 
collapsed across topic and for each topic separately. Because there are five lies and five 
truths in each topic set, the chance level for accuracy given a dichotomous truthful-lying 
decision is five for each topic separately. When the two topics are collapsed such that the 
total number correct out of 20 interviews is the dependent variable, the chance level of 
accuracy is 10.  
Collapsing across topics, young adults, t(166) =10.39, p < .01, and older adults, 
t(186) = 6.36, p < .01, were significantly better than chance in their deception accuracy. 
For the crime topic interviews, both young adults, t(166) = 7.84, p < .01, and older adults, 
t(186) = 4.48, p < .01, were again significantly better than chance at detecting deceit. 
Also in the opinion topic interviews, both young adults, t(166) = 6.42, p < .01, and older 
adults, t(186) = 4.82, p < .01, were significantly better than chance at detecting deceit.  
It is important to note that older adults are not different from chance in the visual 
only condition when examining deceit detection accuracy collapsed across topic, t(59) = 
1.74, p > .05. For the crime topic interviews, older adults are also not significantly 
different from chance for the visual only condition (M = 4.78, SE = .22), p > .05. Older 
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adults are, however, significantly different from chance in all three conditions for opinion 
deceit detection accuracy,  ps < .05. 
4.1.6 Thought Listing 
 There were age differences in the frequency of each category mentioned for the 
following categories: gestures, laughter, nervousness, speed of speech, pauses, quantity 
of response, quality of response and tone of voice, ps < .05. For all of these age 
differences, young adults reported the category more frequently than older adults. These 
age differences in frequencies could be reflecting a tendency for young adults to emit 
more responses than older adults. 
 Interestingly, only deceit detection accuracy in the crime topic interviews is 
related to the thought listing responses. We were interested to see whether age differences 
in the factors used to make deception judgments would mediate the relationship between 
age and deceit detection. First, we examined the point-biserial correlations between the 
eight categories which showed age differences (listed above) and deceit detection 
accuracy in the crime topic interviews (see Table 8).  Next, the two categories which 
showed a significant relationship with deceit detection, quality of argument and tone of 
voice, were tested as mediators using linear regression (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The use 
of quality of the argument as a cue to deception accounted for more of the variance in 
crime topic deceit detection accuracy than age when both variables were included in the 
model, β = .24, SE = .17, p < .01 and β = -.08, SE = .09, p > .05 for quality of argument 
and age group, respectively. That is, participants who reported using the quality of 
argument to make their veracity judgments were better at detecting deceit in the crime 




making deception judgments accounted for more variance in crime deceit detection than 
age when both variables were input as predictors in the model, β = .13, SE = .19, p < .05 
and β = -.10, SE = .09, p > .05 for tone of voice and age group, respectively. When these 
same analyses were conducted separately by the two conditions with age differences 
(visual and audio-visual), none of the category responses emerged as mediators, ps > .05 







Point-Biserial Correlations of Thought Listing Categories with Deceit Detection  
         1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8   9 10
1 Age           1.00
2 Deceit Crime         -.12* 1.00 
3 Gestures -.17** -.07         1.00
4 Laughter         -.28** -.01 .01 1.00 
5 Nervousness        -.25** .01 .06 .10 1.00 
6           Speed of Speech -.14** .03 .01 .08 .04 1.00
7         Pauses -.15** .04 -.02 .12* .08 .18** 1.00
8         Quantity -.12* .08 -.08 .06 .07 .11* .08 1.00
9           Quality -.17** .25** -.19** .06 .10 .14** .32** .17** 1.00




* Correlation is significant at p < .05, two-tailed. 







4.2 Interim Summary of Results 
 The highlights of the results so far are that young adults are better than older 
adults at deceit detection accuracy collapsed across topic in the audio-visual condition. 
Young adults are also better than older adults at detecting deceit in the crime topic 
interviews in the visual only condition. Interestingly, a context-specificity by topic 
emerged, exhibited by the null finding of no age-related differences by condition for the 
opinion topic interviews. No age-related differences were found in the audio only 
condition for either topic. These findings suggest that without the audio component, older 
adults are at a disadvantage when compared to young adults. Finally, the thought listing 
results identify two categories of cues as predictors of crime topic deceit detection 
accuracy over and above age: quality of argument and tone of voice. 
4.3 Individual Difference Measures 
 Several individual difference measures were included in the study as possible 
alternative mediators of the relationship between age and deceit detection. For each of 
these measures a one-way ANOVA was conducted with age as the independent variable 
and the score on the individual difference measure as the dependent variable. Next, the 
relationship between the individual difference measure and deceit detection was 
examined by computing Pearson’s correlation coefficient (see Table 9). If this correlation 
was significant, we tested the mediated model to determine if the individual differences 
could account for age differences in deceit detection. 
4.3.1 Suspiciousness 
 Replicating past findings, young adults (M = 52.54, SE = .79), were more 
suspicious than older adults (M = 47.06, SE = .74), F(1, 352) = 25.70, p < .01. No 
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relationship between suspiciousness and deceit detection (collapsed across topic or 
separately by topic) was found, ps > .05. 
4.3.2 Interpersonal Perception Task 
 Young adults (M = 10.35, SE =.14), outperformed older adults (M = 8.81, SE = 
.13) on the Interpersonal Perception Task, F(1, 352) = 64.49, p < .01. No relationship 
between interpersonal perception and deceit detection (collapsed across topic, crime, or 
opinion) was found, ps > .05. 
4.3.3 Working Memory 
 As reported above, and consistent with the aging literature, young adults (M = 
5.09, SE = .10), scored better on our measure of working memory than older adults (M = 
2.02, SE = .09), F(1, 352) = 511.52, p < .01. Scores on the Audio-Computation Span Task 
are positively related with deceit detection accuracy collapsed across topic, r = .16, and 
deceit detection in the crime topic interviews, r = .13 ( p < .01 and p < .05, respectively). 
That is, participants who scored better on our measure of working memory were better at 
detecting deceit. Because a relationship was found between working memory and deceit 
detection, the mediated model was tested using simultaneous linear regression to 
determine whether individual differences in working memory account for the age 











Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Individual Difference Measures and Deceit 
Detection (N = 354) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Age 
 
1.00       
2 Total Deceit 
 
-0.16** 1.00      
3 Deceit Crime 
 
-0.12* 0.74** 1.00     
4 Deceit Opinion 
 
-0.11* 0.68** 0.01 1.00    
5 Suspiciousness 
 
-0.26** 0.03 0.00 0.04 1.00   
6 Interpersonal  
Perception 
-0.39** 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.12* 1.00  
7 Working Memory 
 
-0.77** 0.16** 0.13* 0.10 0.16** .33** 1.00 
 
* Correlation is significant at p < .05, two-tailed. 














4.4 Emotion Recognition as Mediator 
Recall that the emotion recognition measure included three intensities (low, 
medium, and high) of five different emotions (anger, joy, shame, fear, and disgust). After 
examining the data, we noticed that low and high intensities were showing little 
variability, perhaps due to floor and ceiling effects. Thus, only the medium intensities of 
the emotions measure are included in these analyses. This measure of medium intensity 
emotions showed good reliability, Cronbach’s α = .81.  
First, an Age X Gender ANOVA was conducted with emotion recognition as the 
dependent variable. The interaction was not significant, p > .05. There is, however, a 
main effect of age for emotion recognition with young adults (M = 34.89, SE = .37) 
outperforming older adults (M = 29.26, SE = .35), F(1, 352) = 125.10, p < .01. There is 
also a main effect of gender, with women (M = 32.74, SE = .41) outperforming men (M = 
31.07, SE = .41), F(1, 352) = 8.33, p < .01. Specifically, women were better than men at 
recognizing fear and disgust, ps < .05. 
To test whether individual differences in emotion recognition abilities account for 
the age differences in deceit detection, the crime topic interviews in the visual only 
condition was used as the dependent variable. The crime topic was chosen because the 
opinion topic interviews did not show an effect of condition or any age differences in 
deceit detection by condition analyses. The visual only condition was chosen because this 
is the condition where a deficit in emotion recognition would put older adults at the 
greatest disadvantage when compared to young adults. Fear and shame have been 
identified in the deception literature as two emotions which are present during deception 
(Frank & Ekman, 1997). For this reason, a new emotion recognition variable was created 
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for the mediated model by combining the fear and shame emotions. Using the Baron and 
Kenny (1986) steps for mediation, support was found for a fully mediated model. First, 
age is negatively associated with crime deceit detection in the visual only condition,        
r = -.23, p < .05. Age is also negatively associated with emotion recognition (fear and 
shame), r = -.54, p < .01. When age and emotion recognition are added to a linear 
regression model as predictors of crime deceit detection, emotion recognition is 
positively associated with deceit detection, β = .53, p < .05. Also, in this same 
hierarchical regression analysis, age is no longer a significant predictor of crime deceit 
detection, p > .05. In sum, the age-related differences in crime deceit detection can be 
accounted for by individual differences in emotion recognition such that participants who 
were better at recognizing fear and shame were better at crime topic deceit detection in 
the visual only condition. 
When cognitive abilities were added to these analyses, it did not change the 
model. Also, when the two measures of perceptual abilities were added to the model, the 
relationship between emotion recognition and deceit detection remained significant. That 
is, emotion recognition abilities still account for the variance in deceit detection when 
crime deceit detection accuracy is simultaneously regressed on emotion recognition 
abilities and cognitive and perceptual abilities in the visual only condition. (See Table 10 
for Pearson's correlation coefficients of emotion recognition with cognitive and 







Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Emotion Recognition, Cognitive Abilities, and 
Perceptual Abilities in the Visual Only Condition (N = 115) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Age 
 
1.00       
2 Emotion 
Recognition 
-0.54** 1.00      
3 Vocabulary 
 
0.22* 0.09 1.00     
4 Letter Sets 
 
-0.74** 0.52** 0.21* 1.00    
5 Working 
Memory 
-0.78** 0.48** 0.04 .77** 1.00   
6 Snellen Visual 
Acuity 
.55** -.33** .22* -.38** -.39** 1.00  
7 Benton Facial 
Discrimination 
-.50** .32** .13 .45** .40** -.25** 1.00 
 
* Correlation is significant at p < .05, two-tailed. 
** Correlation is significant at p < .01, two-tailed. 
 
 
4.5 Response Tendencies 
 Emotion recognition abilities do not account for the age differences in deceit 
detection for the opinion topic interviews. Instead, we tested the possibility that a truth 
bias was driving these age differences. That is, there might be differences in the response 
tendencies of young and older adults which can help explain age differences in deceit 
detection. To examine this possibility we used Signal Detection Theory (SDT; first 
applied to problems in sensory psychophysics by Tanner and Swets, 1954). Signal 
detection theory was developed as a method to measure a participant’s ability to detect 
sensory stimuli. In particular, the method provides two different gauges of the 
participant’s behavior: the participant’s sensory sensitivity (d’) and response bias (β or 
c). We were interested in differences in response bias. The advantage of using SDT to 
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explore the response tendencies of young and older adults is that it will provide a single 
statistic of bias that can be tested for age differences. If we were limited to using t-tests, 
we would need to conduct multiple t-tests to exhibit this same effect. 
All of the SDT analyses were done separately for the crime and opinion topic 
interviews. First, the deceit detection accuracy scores were transformed into proportions 
of hit and false alarm rates. A hit is defined as a participant’s response being “truth” 
when the target actually was telling the truth. A false alarm is defined as any time the 
participant said “truth” when the correct answer was lie (see Figure 5).  
 
 
























Signal Detection Theory Operational Definitions 
 
 
For example, if a participant got three of the possible five truths correct in the opinion 
topic interviews, the participant’s hit rate would be 3/5 (.60). Furthermore, if the 
participant identified two of the five possible lies as truths, the participant’s false alarm 
rate would be 2/5 (.40). These proportions were then transformed into z scores by 
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subtracting the mean from each score and dividing by the standard deviation. Response 
bias was computed using the following formula (MacMillan & Creelman, 1990): 
c = -.5[z(H) + z(F)] 
where z(H) is the z score of hits and z(F) is the z score of false alarms. A participant 
would be truth-biased if they had both high hits and high false alarms. Because the 
formula multiplies this positive number by -.5, a participant who is truth-biased would 
have a negative c value. Thus, interpretation is as follows: a response bias of zero would 
indicate no bias, a negative response bias would indicate a truth bias, and a positive 
response bias would indicate a lie-bias. Sensitivity, or d', was also computed to determine 
whether differences in hit rates are an artifact of bias alone or whether there are also age 
differences in sensitivity. The d' statistic was computed using the following formula: 
d' = z (H) - z (FA) 




Signal Detection Statistics by Age Group for Each Topic 
 Sensitivity (d') Bias (c) 
 Young Old Young Old 
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Crime Topic .22 .12 -.14 .11 .04 .05 -.02 .05 





For the crime topic interviews, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with age as the 
independent variable and response bias (c) as the dependent variable. The results were 
not significant, F(1, 352) < 1. Although the results are not significant, it is interesting to 
note that the older adult group’s mean was negative (M = -.02, SE = .05) while the young 
adult mean was positive (M = .04, SE = .05), indicating a trend in the truth-biased and lie-
biased directions, respectively. To determine whether there are age differences in 
sensitivity for the crime topic interviews, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with age as 
the independent variable and sensitivity (d') as the dependent variable. For the crime 
topic interviews, young adults (M = .22, SE = .12) showed greater sensitivity than older 
adults (M = -.14, SE = .11), F = 4.83, p < .05, d = .23. 
In order to determine whether there are age differences in response bias for the 
opinion topic interviews, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with age as the independent 
variable and response bias (c) as the dependent variable. Older adults are more truth-
biased (M = -.12, SE = .05) than young adults (M = .18, SE = .05) in the opinion topic 
interviews, F(1, 352) = 16.75, p < .01 (see Figure 6). In order to determine whether there 
are age differences in sensitivity for the opinion topic interviews, we conducted a one-
way ANOVA with age as the independent variable and sensitivity for the opinion topic 
interviews (d') as the dependent variable. The age differences in sensitivity for the 
opinion topic interviews were not significant, F < 1.0, indicating that age differences in 
hit rates for the opinion topic interviews are an artifact of bias alone. The mediated model 
was tested to see whether truth bias accounts for the age differences in opinion topic 


























































 Age-related differences in deceit detection were explained by impaired emotion 
recognition abilities and heuristics such as response tendencies differentially for the two 
interview topics (crime and opinion, respectively). Specifically, in the crime topic 
interviews, we found that older adults do not benefit from visual information as much as 
young adults, whereas in the opinion topic interviews we found that a truth bias was 
related to deceit detection accuracy. Although our individual difference measures of 
interpersonal perception, trait suspiciousness, and cognitive abilities did show age 
differences, they did not help explain age differences in deceit detection.  
 In an exploratory fashion, we tested whether differences in response tendencies 
were related to differences in deceit detection. That is, in an ambiguous situation, 
participants might rely on a cognitive heuristic, or a rule of thumb, to make their veracity 
judgments. For example, participants might be inclined to respond “truth” as a default 
when they are unsure. This response bias could lead to poor deceit detection accuracy. 
Using signal detection theory, we were able to test this possibility in the crime and 
opinion topic interviews.  
 Interestingly, we found that older adults are truth biased, but only in the opinion 
topic interviews. The pattern of response bias means for the two age groups in the crime 
topic interviews was similar to that in the opinion topic interviews, exhibiting a trend in 
the same direction. These results suggest that older adults are more likely than young 
adults to rely on a cognitive heuristic such as the truth bias. Although in the crime topic 
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interviews we saw that young adults were more sensitive to detecting "hits" than older 
adults, we did not find this age difference for the opinion topic interviews. The response 
biases in the opinion topic interviews, in conjunction with the lack of age differences in 
sensitivity, suggest that age differences in deceit detection accuracy for the opinion topic 
interviews are an artifact of the older adults’ tendency to respond "truth". Again, we 
found that cognitive abilities do not account for this finding. Thus, perhaps the 
application of the truth bias is more motivational in nature than purely resource-
dependent. This possibility is further exemplified by the differential relationships found 
between response bias and deceit detection by topic (i.e., no relationship found for crime 
topics, but a truth bias found for older adults in the opinion topic interviews).  
 As always, many new empirical and theoretical questions have arisen in response 
to the results of this study. First, emotion recognition emerged as an important predictor 
of deceit detection but as a separate process from other cognitive abilities. Second, this 
study specifically implicates the recognition of fear and shame as important for detecting 
deceit, while the deception research also includes disgust as important. Third, we find 
differential effects depending on the topic of the interviews (crime or opinion). The 
fourth point is more a methodological note on the advantages of signal detection theory 
for aging and deception research. These four aspects will be discussed in turn. 
5.1 Emotion Recognition: Influence on Deceit Detection Beyond Cognitive Abilities 
 Replicating past work in the aging literature (Malatesta et al., 1987), we found 
that older adults were worse at decoding facial expressions of emotion when compared to 
young adults. For the crime topic interviews, in the visual only condition, individual 
differences in the ability to recognize fear and shame accounted for more of the variance 
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in deceit detection accuracy than age. These results align with previous research in the 
deception literature which highlights the ability to recognize facial expressions of 
emotion as a critical component for accurate veracity judgments (Frank & Ekman, 1997, 
2004).  
 This finding, together with the null results from testing other individual difference 
measures as mediators, indicates that there is something specifically important about 
emotion recognition for detecting deceit. We did find age-related differences in working 
memory capacity, for example, but these age differences did not account for the age 
differences in deceit detection. We found this same pattern of age differences but no 
support for mediation with our measure of fluid intelligence. Thus, age differences in 
crime topic deceit detection may not be due to speed of processing differences or 
differences in the ability to manipulate information.  
 The question remains as to what process is specific to emotion recognition 
abilities that is not tapped by our measures of working memory and fluid intelligence. 
One possible explanation for a process important for emotion recognition but not 
encompassed by working memory or fluid intelligence is the possibility that differences 
in perceptual abilities led to differences in emotion recognition performance. We did try 
to rule out this possibility by including two measures of visual functioning which did not 
account for the mediating effect of emotion recognition. Perhaps, however, a more fine-
tuned measure of visual functioning is needed to capture the perceptual properties vital 
for emotion recognition.  
 One possibility for the age-related differences in emotion recognition that are not 
captured by fluid measures might be a social factor. The typical assumption is that with 
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age comes greater experience. There may be some emotions, however, which are not as 
prevalently experienced in older adulthood as they are during young adulthood. Older 
adults may not be used to experiencing and interpreting those emotions which they were 
worse at identifying in this study such as anger, shame, and fear.  
One limitation of this research is the generalizability of our interviews to real-
world emotion recognition. If our emotion recognition measure was dynamic instead of 
static it might better represent processes operating in the context of perceiving emotions 
in action. Like the deceit detection interviews in this study, lies in the real world occur in 
dynamic formats; our measure of emotion recognition was static faces on a computer 
screen. A measure of dynamic emotion recognition abilities might help to further explain 
age-related differences in crime topic deceit detection as well as relate differentially to 
cognitive abilities. For example, we might expect a dynamic measure of emotion 
recognition to capture both processing speed and emotion recognition differences. 
5.2 Fear and Shame: Cues to Deception 
 In this study, we found that the ability to recognize fear and shame were related to 
deceit detection in the visual condition for the crime topic interviews. These findings are 
consistent with past research; but the deception literature has also identified disgust as an 
important emotional cue to deceit (Frank & Ekman, 1997). We did not find support in our 
study for disgust being important for deceit detection.  
 First, we need to acknowledge methodological differences in our emotion 
recognition measures in comparison to those previously used. Frank and Ekman (1997) 
used a microexpression test of emotion recognition during which the faces were flashed 
on the screen for 1/25 second. Because we did not want age-related slowing in processing 
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speed to influence our emotion recognition measure, we presented each face for 1.5 
seconds. Replicating past work, however, we did find that fear and shame related to 
deceit detection. Thus, this methodological artifact does not tell the whole story.  
 The research which identified disgust as a valid cue to deception was based on 
trained FACS coders classifying facial expressions of emotion in the crime and opinion 
topic interviews (Frank & Ekman, 1997). The results from these analyses showed that 
fear and disgust were the best emotional cues to deception. Unfortunately, the authors did 
not break down their overall behavioral measure of emotion recognition to identify which 
emotions best correlated with deceit detection. The present study was able to identify the 
specific emotions which predicted better deceit detection in the visual only condition of 
the crime topic interviews. Our population differences accentuated this point: the 
emotions that older adults were poorer at recognizing were those emotions that were 
important for detecting deception. This discrepancy suggests that there is a disconnect 
between the facial expressions of emotions which leak out during lies and the emotional 
cues observers pick up on in these same stimuli. 
5.3 Differential Topic Effects 
 Why did we find evidence for a truth bias in older adults for the opinion topic 
interviews but not in the crime topic interviews? Why did we find age-related differences 
by condition for the crime topic interviews but not the opinion topic interviews? We can 
only speculate as to why this context specificity by topic exists. There are several 
possible explanations which future research might address more directly. 
 One explanation for these differential topic effects is a difference in the severity 
of the transgression for each topic. The crime topic interviews deal with a moral issue: a 
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theft. Thus, older adults may feel much more strongly about their veracity judgments, in 
comparison to the opinion topic interviews, and thus feel more comfortable using the 
available information to form a judgment, rather than relying on a heuristic. Conversely, 
in the social opinion topic interviews, older adults are not dealing with a hot moral issue 
like a crime. Instead, they may wonder why anyone would lie about their social opinion 
and be more likely to trust social opinion interviewees as truthtellers.  
 Research from the social cognition and aging literature can extend the 
interpretation of these findings. In ambiguous situations, older adults have been shown to 
rely on a dispositional bias more so than young adults, but once plausible explanations 
for behavior are provided, older adults no longer exhibit this bias (Blanchard-Fields & 
Horhota, 2005). Moreover, personal beliefs have been shown to guide older adults' social 
judgments more so than young adults (Horhota & Blanchard-Fields, in press).  
 A second explanation for these differential topic effects may be inherent in the 
stimuli themselves: the actual targets may “leak” more emotional cues when being 
questioned in the crime topic interviews than in the opinion topic interviews due to the 
nature of the situation. 
5.4 Signal Detection Theory as a Method 
 The use of signal detection theory to analyze response tendencies allowed us to 
tease apart the response biases for young and older adults. This method gave us a more 
sensitive measure of deceit detection by allowing us to compare truth accuracy and lie 
accuracy rather than only assessing overall accuracy. Signal detection theory might be 
especially relevant for aging studies of deception because the truth and lie accuracies 
show a different pattern for young and older adults. Moreover, the lie-bias measured 
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using signal detection theory could be thought of as state suspiciousness. In future 
research, examining lie-bias using signal detection theory might be a better way to 
explore the relationship between suspiciousness and deceit detection than the Generalized 
Communicative Suspicion scale which measures trait suspiciousness. Additionally, future 
studies might want to include a measure of trust, rather than suspiciousness, because trust 
is another dimension which might be more related to deceit detection than trait 
suspiciousness. 
5.5 Concluding Comments 
 The complexity of the results section illustrates an overarching theme to emerge 
from this study: deceit detection abilities are multiply determined. That is, emotion 
recognition, perceptual abilities, working memory capacity, implicit theories of lie 
detection, response biases, and motivation all play a role in determining whether an 
individual can catch a liar.  
 Despite the evidence of an age-related decline in deceit detection, this study 
carries a hopeful message. Older adults only exhibited a disadvantage compared to young 
adults in certain contexts: the visual only condition and the crime topic. One aspect of the 
older adult’s vulnerability to frauds and scams may be a deficit in emotion recognition, 
but this study shows that there is a way for older adults to compensate for this loss. For 
example, older adults might protect themselves by avoiding making financial decisions at 
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